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Cooperation and the evolution of
intelligence
Luke McNally1,2,*, Sam P. Brown3 and Andrew L. Jackson1,2
1Department of Zoology, School of Natural Sciences, and 2Centre for Biodiversity Research,
Trinity College Dublin, Dublin 2, Republic of Ireland
3Centre for Immunity, Infection and Evolution, School of Biological Sciences,
University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh EH9 3JT, UK
The high levels of intelligence seen in humans, other primates, certain cetaceans and birds remain a major
puzzle for evolutionary biologists, anthropologists and psychologists. It has long been held that social
interactions provide the selection pressures necessary for the evolution of advanced cognitive abilities
(the ‘social intelligence hypothesis’), and in recent years decision-making in the context of cooperative
social interactions has been conjectured to be of particular importance. Here we use an artificial
neural network model to show that selection for efficient decision-making in cooperative dilemmas can
give rise to selection pressures for greater cognitive abilities, and that intelligent strategies can themselves
select for greater intelligence, leading to a Machiavellian arms race. Our results provide mechanistic
support for the social intelligence hypothesis, highlight the potential importance of cooperative behaviour
in the evolution of intelligence and may help us to explain the distribution of cooperation with intelligence
across taxa.
Keywords: reciprocity; Machiavellian intelligence; cognition; social brain; prisoner’s dilemma;
snowdrift game
1. INTRODUCTION
Natural selection never favours excess; if a lower-cost sol-
ution is present, it is selected for. Intelligence is a hugely
costly trait. The human brain is responsible for 25 per
cent of total glucose use, 20 per cent of oxygen use and
15 per cent of our total cardiac output, although
making up only 2 per cent of our total body weight [1].
Explaining the evolution of such a costly trait has been
a long-standing goal in evolutionary biology, leading to
a rich array of explanatory hypotheses, ranging from eva-
sion of predators to intelligence acting as an adaptation
for the evolution of culture [2–4]. Among the proposed
explanations, arguably the most influential has been the
‘social intelligence hypothesis’, which posits that it is the
varied demands of social interactions that have led to
advanced intelligence [4–12].
In recent years, the cognitive demands of reciprocity,
one of the mechanisms posited as important in the main-
tenance of cooperation in humans and other intelligent
taxa, have been suggested to be a causal factor in the evol-
ution of advanced intelligence and human language. This
has been particularly apparent in the evolutionary game
theory literature, where conjecture regarding this relation-
ship is frequent [13–16]. Indeed, there is a rich history of
work relating intelligence and reciprocity in the game
theory literature, though most of this work has focused
on the cognitive abilities required for the evolution of
cooperation, rather than the possible role that the nego-
tiation of these interactions has in the evolution of
intelligence [17–24]. As well as the cognitive abilities
required for the coordination of partners during coopera-
tive acts, both direct (decisions based on what you do
to me) and indirect (decisions based on what you do to
others) reciprocity have additional demands in terms of
the ability to remember previous interactions and to inte-
grate across these interactions to make decisions in
cooperative dilemmas [25–31]. These cognitive demands,
combined with the occurrence of cooperative behaviour
between unrelated individuals in intelligent taxa, suggest
that selection for these mechanisms of cooperation could,
at least in part, be responsible for advanced cognitive
abilities [26].
The many subfields within the social intelligence
hypothesis have shown a rich elaboration of verbal argu-
ments, and data from comparative studies support many
of their predictions [32–34]. However, verbal reasoning
and comparative analysis alone are not sufficient to
assess the relative merit of competing hypotheses [35];
mechanistic models are needed to assess the plausibility
of these different explanations for advanced cognition.
Here, we use an artificial neural network model to focus
on the potential for direct reciprocity, a behaviour that is
widespread in humans, to select for advanced cognitive
abilities. Rather than manufacturing some form of func-
tional relationship between intelligence and fitness, we
allow this relationship to emerge based on the demands
of decision-making in two social dilemmas, and analyse
the consequences for the evolution of intelligence.
2. MATERIAL AND METHODS
(a) The social dilemmas
In order to consider the dynamics of cooperative social inter-
actions, we use the framework of two classic social dilemmas:
the iterated prisoner’s dilemma (IPD) and the iterated
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snowdrift game (ISD). In both games, two players must
choose between cooperation and defection during repeated
rounds. In the event of mutual cooperation or mutual defec-
tion, both players receive payoffs R or P, respectively, while a
defector exploiting a cooperator gets T and the cooperator
gets S. In the prisoner’s dilemma, the benefit of an individ-
ual’s cooperative behaviour goes to their opponent, while
they pay all of the costs (e.g. food sharing, reciprocal coali-
tionary behaviour). This results in a payoff order of T .
R. P. S. Here, the worst possible outcome for an individ-
ual is to cooperate while their opponent defects, while the
best outcome is to defect while the opponent cooperates.
In the snowdrift game, the benefits of cooperative behaviours
are shared between opponents, and the costs are shared
if both individuals cooperate (e.g. cooperative hunting,
coalitionary behaviour with shared benefits). This results in
a payoff order of T . R. S. P. Again, the best outcome
for an individual is to defect while their opponent coopera-
tes, though the worst possible outcome for an individual is
for neither them nor their opponent to cooperate. In
both games, the overall payoff (sum of both individual’s
payoffs) is greatest for mutual cooperation and lowest for
mutual defection.
All of this means that the equilibrium frequency of
cooperation for a single interaction (single-interaction Nash
equilibrium) will be zero in the prisoner’s dilemma but will
be non-zero for a single-interaction snowdrift game [36].
These single-interaction Nash equilibria provide a useful
benchmark against which to assess the effects of contingent
behaviours (i.e. those that depend on the behaviour of
others) in repeated interactions.
(b) The neural network model
Any attempt to define a metric of intelligence will always be a
contentious matter. However, comparative studies across
taxa have usually focused on two main classes of brain
properties as proxies of intelligence: metrics based on relative
or absolute size of the brain or certain brain regions, and
metrics based on more specific properties such as numbers
of cortical neurons [37]. It is with this tradition in mind
that we develop our artificial neural network model, with
evolving network structure, using the number of neurons, i,
as our proxy for intelligence. Each individual can display
varying levels of intelligence, from simply being characterized
by a binary response of always cooperate or always defect to
large neural networks that possess complex neuronal struc-
ture, allowing for computations to inform decisions based
on payoffs and the integration of longer-term memory into
their current decision-making processes.
Each individual in our simulated populations possesses
a neural network that determines their behaviour in social
dilemmas (illustrated in figure 1). The networks each have
two input nodes (which receive the payoffs of the individual
and their opponent in the previous round as inputs) and one
output node (giving the probability that they cooperate
during their next interaction). The hidden layer of each indi-
vidual’s network has an evolving structure, possessing
different numbers of cognitive and context nodes [38]
(figure 1). Cognitive nodes allow for computation based on
the values of network inputs and context nodes, which in
turn allow for the build-up of memory based on previous
states of their associated cognitive nodes.
Computation in the network is implemented via synchro-
nous updating of nodes. The value of each input node is
passed to each of the network’s cognitive nodes, multiplied
by the weight linking the two nodes. Each cognitive node is
also passed the current value of their associated context
node (if they possess one) multiplied by the weight linking
the two nodes. The cognitive nodes sum across all of the
weighted values that they receive and pass this value through
a sigmoidal squashing function, resulting in a value between
0 and 1, analogous to a probability of activation. All context
A A
B
(b)(a)
(c)
D
initial network gains context
node
gains cognitive
node
loses cognitive
+ context node
B C
Figure 1. The artificial neural network model. (a) A schematic to aid in the understanding of our network structures is shown.
Input nodes, which receive the payoffs of both players in the previous round, are labelled A. Cognitive nodes, which can receive
input from both input and context nodes, are labelled B. Context nodes, which store the previous state of their cognitive node
and return this state (times a weight) as input in the next round, are labelled C. The output node that receives inputs from the
cognitive nodes and gives the individual’s decision to cooperate or defect is labelled D. The most complex artificial neural net-
work allowed in our simulations is shown in (b), possessing 10 cognitive nodes and 10 context nodes. A sample of a possible
sequence of mutations to network structure is shown in (c). Individuals gain and lose cognitive and context nodes by random
mutation. If a cognitive node with a connection to a context node is lost by mutation, the context node is also lost.
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nodes are then passed the value of their associated cognitive
nodes. This allows the context nodes to build up memory of
previous interactions without having to store the actual
sequence of events that have occurred. The internal states
of these context nodes could be considered analogous to
emotional states. Finally, the values at all cognitive nodes
are then passed to the output node (multiplied by their
weights), summed and again passed through a sigmoidal
squashing function. This output gives the probability that
the individual will cooperate in the current round. As the sig-
moidal function asymptotes to 0 at –1 and 1 at 1, there will
always be inherent noise in the network’s probabilistic
decision. This property of the function also means that it is
easy to minimize noise in the network’s behaviour if that be-
haviour shows a lack of contingency (as the node can always
be near one of the asymptotes), while contingent behaviour
will show greater noise (as switching is more difficult to
achieve near the asymptotes). This formulation has intuitive
appeal over simply adding extraneous noise to individual
decisions, as in nature we would expect individuals to make
few mistakes when their behaviour is non-contingent, while
more complex decisions would be expected to be more
error-prone. As the network cannot make decisions without
an input, each individual has an additional trait encoding
whether they cooperate or defect in the first round.
We allowed networks to evolve according to natural selec-
tion using a genetic algorithm where fitness is the mean
payoff per round from the iterated games minus a penalty
for the individual’s intelligence, i. When individuals repro-
duce, mutations allow for the gain and loss of nodes from
the hidden layer of their network with a fixed probability.
Context nodes could only be gained if there was already a
cognitive node present without an associated context node.
The loss of a cognitive node with an associated node resulted
also in the loss of the associated context node.
The addition of extra cognitive nodes gives networks the
potential to perform complex computation based on payoffs
by increasing the dimensions of internal representation of the
network. The addition of context nodes gives the potential
for the integration of longer-term memory of previous inter-
actions in these computations. If an individual possessed no
hidden layer nodes in its network, its behaviour in all rounds
was decided by its first round move (i.e. they either always
cooperated or always defected). The weights of each node
in the network (arrowed lines in figure 1) and the threshold
of each node (see the electronic supplementary material)
were encoded as continuous genetic traits, again subject to
mutation during reproduction. This means that, while the
number of nodes in the network constrains the possible be-
havioural repertoire, it is the way that the constituent parts
of the network interact that actually decides the individual’s
behaviour. In this way, our metric of intelligence assesses
the potential for complex behaviour that the individual pos-
sesses, rather than the appropriateness or ‘wisdom’ of their
behaviour, similarly to the measures of intelligence used in
comparative studies.
(c) Model implementation
In order to elucidate when selection favoured intelligence, we
ran 10 replicates of our model for both the IPD and ISD,
with each replicate lasting 50 000 generations. The payoff
values used for all simulations were R ¼ 6, P ¼ 2, T ¼ 7 and
S ¼ 1 for the IPD, and R ¼ 5, P ¼ 1, T ¼ 8 and S ¼ 2 for
the ISD. The genetic algorithm was implemented as follows
(see the electronic supplementary material for further details):
— an initial population of random networks was generated;
— each individual played every other individual in the popu-
lation (50 individuals) in an IPD or ISD;
— each individual network’s fitness was calculated as their
mean payoff per round minus a fitness penalty for their
level of intelligence, i;
— individuals were selected to reproduce asexually with
probability proportional to their fitness;
— newly produced offspring underwent mutation of their
network weights, node thresholds and network structure
with constant probabilities;
— the previous generation died; and
— the algorithm returned to step 2 until 50 000 generations
was reached.
During simulations we recorded the frequency of
cooperation in the population, the intelligence of individuals
(i) and assessments of the behaviour of individuals against a
pre-determined test set of moves (see the electronic sup-
plementary material). We then analysed the gradients of
selection for intelligence across these simulations by taking
selection for intelligence as the covariance between fitness
and intelligence in any given generation [39]. As 50 million
individual neural networks were simulated in our study,
and individuals were not constrained to base their behaviour
only on the previous move, our simulations generated a great
diversity of strategies. In order to gain a coarse-grained over-
view of the strategic composition of the population, we
clustered individuals based on their proximity to four canoni-
cal strategy types: always-defect-like, always-cooperate-like,
tit-for-tat-like (do what your opponent did to you) and
Pavlov-like (if your payoff is over a threshold, repeat your
previous move). Assignment to each of these strategy types
was based on which of these four strategies each individual
network clustered closest to based on its behaviour against
the test set. While this clustering is only a coarse-grained
view, it allows assessment of the effects of shifts towards con-
tingent cooperative strategies on selection for intelligence.
Additionally, contingent human cooperation has previously
clustered as either tit-for-tat-like or Pavlov-like [40], though
longer-term memory is often included [41]. For full details
of our data analysis, we direct readers to the electronic
supplementary material.
3. RESULTS
Our model shows the spontaneous evolutionary emer-
gence of behaviours similar to strategies known to
perform well in the IPD and ISD, such as tit-for-tat and
Pavlov, as well as simple always-cooperate or always-
defect strategies (figure 2) [42]. Although our networks’
behaviours are similar to these strategies, they often
show integration over many previous rounds to decide
on their next moves. For example, manual interrogation
of networks revealed that, of the tit-for-tat type strategies
that emerge, many are tit-for-2(or more)-tats, and many
of the Pavlov-like strategies also show a threshold mech-
anism, switching to constant defection against
opponents that show behaviour close to an always-defect
strategy. Behaviour was observed that appeared to be
close to many other strategies—for example, grim variants
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(cooperate until the opponent defects, then defect for-
ever), though often requiring more than one defection
to trigger permanent defection; false cooperator
(cooperate first then switch to defection), though often
giving another cooperative move after many defections;
and many other variants of tit-for-tat such as 2-tits-for-
1-tat and 2-tits-for-2-tats. It is worth noting that strategies
of these types that use longer-term memory are observed
in behavioural experiments of repeated games with noise
[41]. These responsive strategies require greater cognitive
abilities in order to carry out computations based on pay-
offs, memorize past rounds and integrate across them to
make decisions, in comparison with the lower require-
ments of simply always cooperating or defecting. We
hasten to add, however, that the strategies emerging
only resemble these strategies; the strategies vary in a con-
tinuous manner and often incorporate memory over more
rounds. Our goal here is not to describe the strategies that
can emerge in repeated games, as there is already exten-
sive literature on this topic (see table 2.1 in [43]), but
rather to elucidate the potential effects of their evolution
on selection for cognitive capacities.
In order to elucidate the causal factors leading to the
evolution of more complex strategies, we analyse the gradi-
ent of selection for intelligence in response to population
features such as the prevalence of cooperative acts.
We find that the selection for intelligence is maximized
as the level of cooperation in the population moves above
the single-interaction Nash equilibria towards more
cooperative regimes (figure 3). In the IPD, this maximum
occurs during increases in cooperation from the single-
interaction Nash equilibrium, whereas in the ISD selection
for intelligence is maximized at levels of cooperation just
above the single-interaction Nash equilibrium. This discre-
pancy between the games is explained by the different
natures of their single-interaction Nash equilibria. In the
IPD, this equilibrium is zero, meaning that declining
cooperation near this equilibrium is caused by increases
in the frequency of individuals that always defect, requiring
only little cognitive ability. In the ISD, the equilibrium is
non-zero (0.23 in our simulations), meaning that decreases
in cooperation back towards the equilibrium can be caused
by ‘meaner’ contingent strategies (e.g. 2-tits-for-1-tat and
false-cooperator variants), as well as individuals that
always defect. As a result, transitions back to the single-
interaction Nash equilibrium in the ISD can in
principle select for intelligence, while this is very unlikely
in the IPD.
We also find that increasing intelligence decreases the
mean frequency of cooperative acts in the IPD (Spearman’s
rank correlation test; r ¼ 20.2333, p, 0.001; figure 4a),
while slightly increasing cooperation in the ISD (Spear-
mans’ rank correlation test; r ¼ 0.0089, p, 0.0001, figure
4b). Increasing intelligence increases the variance in the fre-
quency of cooperative acts in the population in both the IPD
(Breusch–Pagan test; intercept¼ 0.0294, slope ¼ 0.0582,
p, 0.0001; figure 4a) and the ISD (Breusch–Pagan test;
intercept ¼ 0.0309, slope ¼ 0.0384, p, 0.001; figure 4b),
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Figure 2. The emergence of intelligent strategies. Shown are the dynamics during 10 000 generation subsets of our simulations
for the (a,c) prisoner’s dilemma and the (b,d) snowdrift game. (a,b) Sample cycles in the frequency of cooperative acts in the
population. (b,d) Frequencies of different strategy types (black, always-defect-like; white, always-cooperate-like; dark grey, tit-
for-tat-like; light grey, Pavlov-like) as determined by clustering individuals with their nearest pure strategy (see §2 and elec-
tronic supplementary material for details). Transitions to cooperation are characterized by high numbers of contingent
strategies, followed by the invasion of the always-cooperate strategy.
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showing that intelligence can facilitate greater extremes
of cooperation. These results can be explained by assort-
ment of individuals’ cooperative acts [44]; the contingent
strategies facilitated by increased intelligence allow an indi-
vidual to increase the probability that they assort their
cooperative acts with other cooperative acts. This leads to
a synergistic process, where this increase in cooperation
due to increased intelligence creates further opportunities
for intelligent individuals to engage in mutual cooperation.
However, as levels of cooperation increase further this feed-
back can break down, as there may be enough cooperation
occurring for unconditional cooperators to increase in the
population, allowing in turn for the invasion of uncondi-
tional defectors or ‘meaner’ intelligent strategies (e.g. grim
variants, false-cooperator variants, etc.). This results in
intelligence-facilitating cycles in the levels of cooperation
seen in the population (figure 2), which increases both the
variance in, and the maximum level of, cooperation.
In addition to dependency on the prevalence of, and
change in, cooperative actions (figure 3), we find that intel-
ligence can be subject to a Machiavellian runaway process
[11,12]. In the ISD, as the frequency of contingent (intel-
ligent) strategies increases, so too does selection for
intelligence in the population (tit-for-tat-like strategies:
Spearman’s r ¼ 0.2025, p, 0.0001; Pavlov-like strategies:
r ¼ 0.2352, p , 0.0001; see figure 5; electronic sup-
plementary material, table S1 and figure S1). In the IPD,
increasing frequencies of tit-for-tat and Pavlov reduces
selection for intelligence at low levels of cooperation (fre-
quency of cooperation ,0.5; tit-for-tat: r ¼ 20.0945,
p, 0.0001; Pavlov: r ¼ 20.0529, p, 0.0001), but does
increase selection for intelligence when cooperation
frequency of cooperation
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Figure 3. Selection for intelligence and transitions to cooperation. Shown is the level of selection for intelligence, taken as the
covariance between fitness and intelligence, against the frequency of cooperation in the current generation and the change in
the frequency of cooperation since the last generation. Darker shades indicate greater selection for intelligence. White areas
indicate impossible value combinations. Selection for intelligence is maximized during transitions away from single-interaction
equilibria, which are no cooperation for the IPD (a), and a frequency of cooperation of 0.23 for the ISD (b). Values displayed
were smoothed using a Gaussian kernel.
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Figure 4. Intelligence and the distribution of cooperation. Shown are the relationships between the frequency of cooperative
acts in the population and the mean level of intelligence in the population (a) for the prisoner’s dilemma and (b) for the snow-
drift game. Mean values are shown by the open circles and lines, and the ranges of the data are shown by the error bars. Greater
intelligence decreases the mean level of cooperation in the IPD, while slightly increasing the mean level of cooperation in the
ISD. The maximum and variance in the frequency of cooperative acts increases with intelligence, showing that the evolution of
intelligent, contingent strategies leads to greater extremes in the frequency of cooperation.
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is more frequent (frequency of cooperation  0.5; tit-
for-tat: r ¼ 0.5491, p, 0.0001; Pavlov: r ¼ 0.3187,
p, 0.0001). The reason for this distinction between the
IPD and the ISD is that there must already be some
cooperation occurring for cooperative contingent strategies
to be favoured via their ability to assort cooperative acts.
In the ISD, the partially cooperative single-interaction
equilibrium provides sufficient baseline cooperation for
tit-for-tat and Pavlov to be favoured, whereas in the IPD
the single-interaction equilibrium of zero cooperation
means that unless contingent strategies (or random drift)
have already increased cooperation, tit-for-tat-like and
Pavlov-like strategies cannot be favoured, and hence
cannot lead to an arms race. Note that it is still the case
that intelligence is selected for in the IPD when coopera-
tive acts are rare yet increasing (figure 3a). However, the
cooperative acts that drive selection for intelligence in
this case are generated by less cooperative contingent strat-
egies, which cluster with always-defect as their closest pure
strategy (r ¼ 0.1095, p, 0.0001; see electronic sup-
plementary material, table S1 and figure S1). This means
that there is a succession in the arms race in the IPD,
with ‘mean’ contingent strategies initially increasing selec-
tion for intelligence at low cooperation, and ‘kind’
contingent strategies increasing selection for intelligence
as cooperation increases.
It is not any particular single strategy that drives these
arms races; rather, as the complexity of the strategies in
the population increases, there is selection for other com-
plex strategies to outwit them. Unlike previous analyses
where fixed strategies or strategies with constrained
memory were used, our open-ended system allows for
near infinite strategic variations to outwit opponents. In
this way, selection for intelligence occurs owing to a con-
stantly shifting strategic environment, where the ‘best
response’ to the population of strategies can be shifting
from generation to generation. Increases in memory
allow for the potential of the recognition of opponents’
strategies, allowing for the alteration of one’s own strategy
in response (e.g. Pavlov-like strategies that can recognize
individuals that always defect). In turn this can allow
for attempts to deceive opponents regarding one’s own
strategy (e.g. false cooperators).
4. DISCUSSION
It is important here to note the closed nature of our model
system; individuals can only choose within one social task
(whether to cooperate or defect against another individual
based on their behaviour in previous interactions with
them). However, our results may apply in principle to
other social scenarios where individuals use strategies to
decide who to cooperate with or when to cooperate,
such as indirect reciprocity [17,18], policing/punishment
[45,46] and partner choice [47–49]. Along with kin selec-
tion, these are the major mechanisms thought to lead to
transitions to cooperative groups. As the intelligence of an
individual increases, it is likely that more of these behav-
ioural repertoires will become available to them, with
increased intelligence acting as a pre-adaptation. For
example, increased intelligence owing to selection for
direct reciprocity could facilitate the evolution of indirect
reciprocity or partner choice, highlighting the contingent
nature of social evolution in multiple strategic dimen-
sions [50]. The facilitation of new social behaviours due
to emergent intelligence could allow for a perpetuated
Machiavellian arms race leading to ever-greater levels of
intelligence. Additionally, in our simulations populations
evolved to play only a single game (either the IPD or
ISD). The simultaneous play of multiple games could
greatly increase strategic complexity, with the possibility
of the integration of information from previous interac-
tions in games with different payoff structures into the
decision-making process.
It has previously been suggested that the pinnacles of
cooperative behaviour in nature show a bimodal distri-
bution with intelligence, with the most cooperative
species displaying either limited cognition (e.g. microbes,
social hymenoptera) or exceptional intelligence (e.g.
humans and other primates, certain cetaceans and
birds) [26]. It is clear in the former case that cooperation
has evolved primarily owing to combinations of kin selec-
tion and ecological factors [51]. However, in the latter
case, kin selection is not the only mechanism leading to
cooperation, and may not even be the most important.
A recent study has in fact suggested that relatedness was
too low in human hunter–gatherer groups for kin selec-
tion to drive the evolution of human cooperation [52].
In highly intelligent species, contingent behaviours (reci-
procity, partner choice, etc.) appear to have been
important in the evolution of cooperation [26]. Our
results may help us to explain this pattern by showing
that the selection for appropriate behavioural assort-
ment of cooperative acts can lead to selection for greater
cognitive abilities and Machiavellian arms races, and that
intelligence facilitates greater extremes of cooperation.
Additionally, although kin selection is still of importance
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Figure 5. Strategic composition and selection for intelli-
gence. The barplots show the Spearman rank correlation
(r) between the frequency of each of our four strategy
types and selection for intelligence for (a) all levels of
cooperation, (b) low cooperation (frequency of cooperative
acts less than 0.5) and (c) high cooperation (frequency of
cooperative acts greater than or equal to 0.5). Tit-for-tat-
like and Pavlov-like strategies always increase selection for
intelligence in the ISD, but only when cooperation is high
in the IPD. For further details, see electronic supplementary
material, figure S1 and table S1.
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in highly intelligent taxa, high relatedness may hinder
the evolution of intelligence by driving unconditional
cooperation to fixation in the population, without any
need of contingent behaviours.
A trait as complex as advanced intelligence is likely to
have evolved owing to a combination of several factors
rather than a single factor [4]. Along with the social
intelligence hypothesis, many other theories attempt-
ing to explain the evolution of advanced intelligence
have been suggested, among them that intelligence is
an adaptation for tool use [53,54], that intelligence
is an adaptation for social learning and the accumulation
of culture [55–57], and that intelligence is the result of
sexual selection [58]. All of these theories are supported
by evidence from at least some of the most intelligent ani-
mals. However, the difficulty lies in disentangling the
traits that are causal factors in the evolution of intelligence
from those that are by-products of advanced intelligence.
The combination of game theoretic frameworks and arti-
ficial neural network models presented here may provide a
framework for the evaluation of the mechanistic strengths
of these different hypotheses. While previous models have
sought to relate cooperation and intelligence, the focus
has most frequently been on the cognitive requirements
of cooperation, rather than on the selection for intelli-
gence. Many of these models have lacked an explicit
brain structure [17–22], and among those studies that
have used artificial neural networks, we know of no
examples where the network structure was allowed to
freely evolve or implications of selection for decision-
making strategies for the evolution of intelligence were
directly addressed [23,24]. While artificial neural net-
works are not real brains, relying on abstraction of the
activity of millions of real neurons down to a manageable
number of artificial neurons, they can provide insight into
the dynamics of cognitive evolution and allow for the flex-
ible evolution of behaviour [59]. Our results show that, in
a freely evolving system, selection for efficient decision-
making in social interactions can give rise to selection
pressures for advanced cognition, supporting the view
that the transition to the cooperative groups seen in the
most intelligent taxa may be the key to their intellect.
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